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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19 OF RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 in which the Security Council:

> "Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;
>
> "Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;"

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the further action taken since my report of 26 January 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Humanitarian activities are covered in section II, political reconciliation in section III, establishment of a Somali police force in section IV and public information activities in section V. Section VI sets out my current thinking on the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to what will become UNOSOM II. Financial aspects are covered in section VII and my observations are contained in section VIII.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992) (26 January-28 February 1993)

3. The specific terms of reference entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concern:

(a) The operations and further deployment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (para. 6);

(b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);

(c) The establishment of mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and UNITAF (para. 13), including the attachment of UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of UNITAF (para. 15);

(d) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. The operations of UNOSOM

4. In my report of 26 January 1993 to the Security Council (S/25168), I indicated that a major preoccupation for UNOSOM at that juncture was the planning for the arrangements for the transition of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning included present plans for deployment of troops to northern Somalia, proposals for mine clearance, creation of a Somali police force and gradual strengthening of the UNOSOM headquarters military component.

5. The military component of UNOSOM currently has a strength of 715 all ranks, composed mainly of an infantry battalion of 500 all ranks, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia, which had been authorized under Security Council resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, I am continuing to strengthen UNOSOM headquarters. I have also appointed a Force Commander who will manage the transition process and command UNOSOM II when it is established.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

6. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) UNITAF has deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia. No troops have been deployed in the north and in border areas. The overall security situation in the sectors under the control of UNITAF has slowly improved, although incidents of violence continue to occur in the major population centres and in some rural areas. The UNITAF Commander has declared that "all areas are stable or relatively stable". However, UNITAF forces have continued to be the target of sniper fire and harassment, and, especially in recent weeks, major incidents of resumed fighting or rioting have been reported from Kismayo and Mogadishu. While most major clans and factions have welcomed the deployment of UNITAF and have cooperated, the positions of some of the faction leaders have not always remained consistent. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country has reduced the influence of those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. A number of disarmament forays have been carried out on a limited scale, both in Mogadishu and in other locations

within the designated sectors. It should be noted that the area under UNITAF control comprises only 40 per cent of the country's territory. No systematic attempt has been made to establish a secure environment outside this area.

C. Mechanisms for coordination

7. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

(i) A policy group on Somalia is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;

(ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned and representatives of the United States, meets weekly;

(iii) A liaison team composed of United States officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;

(iv) A UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

(b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu, the UNOSOM Force Commander and the Commander of UNITAF are working closely in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Much of the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose. A UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with UNITAF headquarters.

8. Several of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have asked to be consulted on the current operations of the Force and progress on planning for the transition. I have initiated regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force are invited.

D. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

9. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have, in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council, continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with regional organizations, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

10. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Somalia which I convened at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa (4-15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting:

(a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993;

(b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement);

(c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help to resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

11. I also reported that, as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee was scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference. Regrettably, the Committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate, alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

12. A further meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives would not attend as long as SNF and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual Committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers to be invited to the Conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee.

13. Subsequent consultations with SNA on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference have helped to clear the way for convening a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. SNA has agreed not to insist on the exclusion of the smaller parties from participation at the Conference. It was also agreed that the participants should include politicians, community leaders, women and military representatives of the warring parties.

14. The only aspect of participation which has yet to be resolved is the size of the respective delegations of the parties. The parties have requested the United Nations to devise a formula for a fair allocation of delegates to each party.

15. Following these encouraging developments, my Special Representative issued invitations to the parties to attend a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee in Mogadishu. The Committee held its first formal meeting on 23 February 1993 and completed its work when it resumed its meeting on 27 February following three days of interruption owing to rioting and fighting in Mogadishu (24-26 February). All Committee members, except the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), were represented at the meeting. In addition to the United Nations, representatives of the Horn of Africa Committee and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries were also present at the meeting.

16. On the first day of the meeting, the Committee adopted a report on participation, the draft agenda and procedures for reaching decisions. When the meeting resumed on 27 February, SNA submitted written reservations notably on the criteria for participation. The Committee agreed to circulate immediately its report to all political movements since time constraints would not allow the reconvening of the informal preparatory meeting of the whole to which it was expected to submit its report.

17. The progress achieved by the Committee has cleared the way for proceeding with arrangements for a meeting on national reconciliation. It is my intention to invite a broad cross-section of Somalis, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons to a Conference on National Reconciliation, to be held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 19 March 1993. The categories of participants have been agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee. In addition to national reconciliation, the meeting will also consider organizational matters.

18. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council. UNOSOM will therefore continue to promote and facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help to keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

19. As mentioned in my progress report of 26 January 1993, the deployment of UNITAF forces has facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia at a quickly increased rate. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation has fallen dramatically in many areas.

20. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is bound to be affected by the security situation, which has tended to vary at times from week to week and from region to region,

even though during the early period of the deployment of UNITAF the security situation had improved. Many of the "technical" vehicles were reported to have been withdrawn or placed in cantonment and large-scale looting decreased substantially. Commercial and market activities appeared to be picking up and some schools were reopened. Agricultural activities have been on the increase. However, in recent weeks the security situation has deteriorated.

21. As of the time of writing of the present report, the situation in many parts of the country remains complex and tense. Especially in rural areas and along Somalia's borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, security conditions remain unstable. The murders in January and February 1993 of United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief workers highlight the extreme fragility of the security situation in spite of the presence of large numbers of military forces. This also highlights again the importance of a secure environment for the effective delivery of emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance.

22. It is in this context that the United Nations, in close cooperation with relevant organizations of the United Nations system and international NGOs as well as Somali representatives, is in the process of preparing a relief and rehabilitation programme for 1993.

23. The needs of Somalia are immense and urgent. In the southern and central parts of the country, large numbers of people remain destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continue to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation present major health threats. With the present security arrangements enabling areas hitherto inaccessible to be reached, some for the first time in many months, it has been confirmed that increased and expanded emergency programmes will be needed through most - if not all - of 1993.

24. It has become apparent that a substantial portion of Somalis are ready to rebuild their lives and their society. The first steps towards recovery and normalcy must be rapidly and judiciously supported to prevent further social and economic deterioration or a lapse into a new cycle of internecine killing and brutality.

25. Two major challenges in 1993 will be to facilitate the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees, according to figures provided by Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and internally displaced persons as well as providing jobs and work for the many millions of Somalis who are presently unemployed. Among these groups are the many thousands of crews of "technicals", armed gangs, militias and private armies of the various factions. While channelling these people into lawful pursuits may be difficult, the creation of work through large-scale labour forces carrying out activities such as road repairs, canal clearing and sanitation is essential if Somalia is ever to become stable. Alongside such endeavours, vocational training programmes and adult literacy courses must also be explored.

26. As regards refugees and displaced persons, some have already spontaneously returned to their home areas in recent months. These groups will need assistance to return to agricultural and/or livestock pursuits. However, many refugees and displaced people have indicated they are not yet willing to return home because of uncertain security in their areas of origin. These groups require continued relief assistance. For others who have lost their homes and their land, or where other families now occupy these areas, new alternative sites must be found. Given the current situation on the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya and political pressures for the Somali refugees to return to their own country, it is also imperative that contingency plans and stocks of household goods, food and other commodities are in hand to cope with sudden mass influxes back to Somalia.

27. A third major challenge concerns national capacity-building. National and regional Somali institutions and civil administration have virtually ceased to exist. None the less there remains considerable institutional memory and expertise on the part of former civil servants and local leaders. Programmes planned in 1993 must utilize these resources to the fullest extent possible, particularly in the consultative process of project identification and subsequent implementation. Somali women have assumed a stronger economic and political role as a result of civil strife. This trend will be encouraged in 1993 through the close involvement of Somali women's groups in both the planning and the delivery of assistance.

28. Countrywide, Somalis are calling for assistance in re-establishing education facilities. Most youngsters have no access to schools and the education of former students in the 15-25 age group has been totally disrupted. For want of alternatives, many of them have joined the bands of armed gangs roaming the streets and the countryside. The reopening of schools countrywide will be of vital importance to the process of returning to peace and stability.

29. The 100-day accelerated and expanded programme of assistance for Somalia, which ended on 19 January 1993, was launched at the height of the crisis in 1992 at a time when the focus was rightly on saving lives. At the Addis Ababa follow-up conference on the 100-day programme in early December 1992, participants agreed that efforts in 1993 should focus on beginning to return Somalia to normalcy. While the present relief and recovery programme for 1993 recognizes the need for continued large-scale relief assistance, it has been designed to go beyond the ongoing relief effort to pave the way for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction.

30. The cost of restoring Somalia as a nation and society will be enormous. It will take many years even to reach pre-war levels. As prospects for peace and stability improve, the international community will undoubtedly be called upon to assist the people of Somalia in supporting long-term national reconstruction and development. In the interim, much can be done immediately through the joint efforts of the international community and the Somali people. A main objective of the 1993 programme is thus to set the stage for such initiatives by enhancing the absorptive capacity of Somalia's human and institutional resources.

31. Underlying the programming process is a sectoral core group structure to assess needs and devise projects for the 1993 programme. Ten core groups, comprising representatives of local and international NGOs, Somali organizations, donor Governments, ICRC and United Nations agencies, have been formed to cover the following priority sectors: health, water, food, security, nutrition, sanitation, employment, administrative rehabilitation, police forces, agriculture and livestock. These core groups will serve as the focal points for sectoral monitoring and reviews, leading to periodic updates. Simultaneously with this process, a regional input was sought through the established relief communities in the nine regional centres in the southern and central parts of the country. Inputs from the north-east and the north-west, primarily for rehabilitation, are put together through the UNOSOM regional offices in those areas. Their inputs have also been reflected in the present document.

32. A United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the relief and rehabilitation programme and receive pledges from donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the conference. A positive outcome of the humanitarian conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

33. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the programme, particularly the coordination of relief efforts and the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be provided in the context of UNOSOM II with the necessary support in order to enable him to discharge his responsibilities.

Mine-clearance

34. The mine-clearance problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, an NGO, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and agricultural lands west of Burao. The victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

35. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies have reported that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200 kilometres of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

36. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the Somali National Movement (SNM) when it reoccupied northern Somalia but out of its team of 60, some 40 per cent became mine casualties. A United Kingdom company, RIMFIRE, has been operating under contract from Médecins sans Frontières and UNHCR. It is reported that it has lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area and enabled the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

37. The UNOSOM military component will not have clearance of minefields as a mission objective although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well be a requirement for route clearance since mines may be used in a harassing role by some of the factions.

38. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the north. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete clearing before they can be restored to use.

39. It will therefore be necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, it is my intention to send the United Nations demining team of experts to Somalia to establish the extent of the problem. Following this visit, a mine-clearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine-clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained, as in Cambodia, to undertake the major part of the mine-clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

III. POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

41. Ultimately, all the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia are directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance. The absence of a central Government has aggravated the social, economic and political difficulties in the country. In fact, the non-existence of a Government in Somalia is one of the main reasons for the now more robust role of the Organization in the country.

42. Various avenues have been actively explored to enhance Somalia's capability to govern itself. In this connection, my Special Representative and other senior officials have been consulting with elders, leaders, warring factions and women's professional groups on how best to create a broad-based Government.

43. I and my Special Representative have encountered difficulties in our efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation in Somalia. National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions and other leaders and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country. The primary initiative for national reconciliation must be left to the Somalis themselves. While this may be the ideal approach, the experience thus far has clearly shown the need for the United Nations to be given a broader mandate, not only in organizing, but also in promoting and advancing, the cause of national reconciliation.

44. As reported to the Security Council in my progress report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The participants reached agreement on three major documents (see para. 10 above).

45. As indicated in paragraph 32 above, a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance is to be held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, to be followed immediately by the Conference on National Reconciliation. These meetings are expected to provide an opportunity for all segments of Somali society, including the political factions, movements, community leaders, women, intellectuals and others to meet under one roof and discuss the problems of political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance as well as programmes for viable rehabilitation and reconstruction.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOMALI POLICE FORCE

46. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (S/24992, para. 30 and S/25168, para. 23) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had sent an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

47. The team was requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

48. The expert team was also requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law and order as well as the discharge of police responsibilities, while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

49. As mentioned in paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an interim auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will, as a temporary arrangement, oversee road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres, thus relieving United Nations agencies and NGOs from the dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with a view eventually to integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

50. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include an international civilian police component in the future UNOSOM II, but would refrain from making any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore shortly bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of this civilian police force.

V. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

51. To support the execution of the new mandate for UNOSOM II, an intensive and expanded information campaign will be required. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM II will be operating must be translated into vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes, new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intention to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

52. The information component in UNOSOM II will absorb themes developed on a day-to-day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health and hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

53. The Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat has secured an agreement with Radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by which Radio Cairo's External Services Network translates and broadcasts in Somalia United Nations-produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in the light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of the UNOSOM II information programme. Similar arrangements with radio stations in the neighbouring countries will be explored. In the meantime the United Nations is arranging the modalities for

UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station, which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

VI. THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II

The present situation

54. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, had authorized the Secretary-General and certain Member States to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

55. There is no doubt that the presence and operations of UNITAF have had, especially during the initial period of its deployment, a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, as indicated in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, this improvement cannot yet be regarded as irreversible and conditions are still volatile. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. As mentioned above, UNITAF has deployed only in the central and southern parts of the country. Disarmament is far from complete.

The new mandate

56. The Council will now have to consider whether to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII of the Charter. The consequence of such a decision would be far-reaching for political, legal and logistical reasons and would entail a major financial commitment. The view which I have conveyed to the Security Council during the last two months is still current and valid: without improved security all over the country the political process cannot prosper and humanitarian operations will remain vulnerable to disruption. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to ensure that parallel steps are taken: cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence towards peace and I have assured them that the international community stands ready to support their efforts in this direction.

57. My firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament. Moreover, as indicated in my report of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), UNOSOM II's mandate will include the following military tasks:

(a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993;

(b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;

(c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;

(d) To seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms;

(e) To secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(f) To protect, as required, the personnel, installations and equipments of United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;

(g) To continue the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas;

(h) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(i) To carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

58. It is clear to me that the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment in Somalia is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia. Moreover, there have been, especially recently, some disheartening reverses. Accordingly, the threat to international peace and security which the Security Council ascertained in the third preambular paragraph of resolution 794 (1992) is still in existence. Consequently UNOSOM II will not be able to implement the above mandate unless it is endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Cease-fire and disarmament concept

59. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993. Annex III to that report, "Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament", concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the international community "will be requested to

provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

60. On the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a combined planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM has developed a Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept.

61. Under this concept, the disarmament process would be continuous and irreversible. It would continue as long as required or until a Somali Government was functioning effectively. A standardized and simple process would be used to disarm all factions. Once a faction had committed itself to disarmament by placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim those weapons.

62. Throughout the process, it would be useful to keep the major faction leaders informed about progress in disarming all the factions. This would place political pressure on factions that seek to delay or fail to comply with the disarmament process and would provide a sense of security for the factions complying with that process.

63. To be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable. Those factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

64. As called for in the Addis Ababa agreements, both the cease-fire and the disarmament process should be carried out under modalities agreed to by the Somalis themselves under the supervision and with the cooperation of UNOSOM II.

65. The concept outlined above would require the establishment of cantonment and transition sites. A cantonment is defined as a location where heavy weapons, including all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be stored. A transition site is defined as a location where factional forces would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received guidance and training for their eventual reintegration in civilian life.

66. Cantonment sites should be designated in the vicinity of current force locations. Transition sites should be selected by the United Nations after consultation with the Somali factions. Cantonment and transition sites should be separated from each other to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons.

67. A committee composed of United Nations and faction representatives should jointly determine those heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army and which would be retained in the cantonments and the rest would be destroyed. The heavy weapons should be delivered to cantonment sites

by faction personnel before they proceed to the transition sites. Cantonment site security would be the responsibility of UNOSOM II.

68. Some personnel in the transition sites should be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for security purposes. Accommodation in the new sites should be temporary, pending relocation and reintegration in civilian society. The transition sites should at all times be open for verification by UNOSOM. Limited assistance would be offered by the United Nations in transporting faction personnel to the transition sites. Transition sites within each region/geographical area would be occupied simultaneously, in order to provide a sense of security for all participants.

69. The operational concept outlined above is based on the assumption that UNOSOM will assist in implementing the Addis Ababa agreements. Both UNITAF and my staff are aware of the administrative and financial problems that will arise in the storage of heavy weapons and in the accommodation and upkeep of demobilized militias for an indeterminate period of time. I consider however that alternative methods, such as material or financial incentives for disarmament, should be considered an option to be kept under review in the light of the experience that will be gathered in this process.

Military concept of operations

70. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would have to be substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions and to ensure a secure environment as quickly as possible both in those areas covered by UNITAF and in those that are not. It could be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

71. It is estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support required. The logistic contingent, the bulk of which would initially come from UNITAF, will constitute an integral part of UNOSOM. I have also received an understanding from the United States Government that a tactical quick reaction force would be available in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II; a memorandum of understanding will be concluded between the United States and UNOSOM during the transfer phase.

72. To put the proposed strength in perspective, it is useful to bear in mind that UNITAF, with an initial strength of 37,000, is deployed in 40 per cent of the territory. It might be asked why in that case the recommendation is for a total military component of only 28,000 for deployment in the entire territory of Somalia.

73. At the beginning of the operation, UNITAF introduced into the theatre a large force of approximately 37,000, including approximately 8,000 at sea, in order to break down resistance and take control of the situation. Once this was done and organized fighting with heavy weapons had largely ceased, the

requirements were scaled down. At present there are approximately 28,400 UNITAF forces ashore, including heavy construction forces. The task at hand now is to control sporadic and localized fighting and can therefore be dealt with by fewer troops. Secondly, intelligence-gathering capabilities that have been developed on the ground will give UNOSOM warning of violent situations developing and allow the Force Commander to readjust his troop deployment. Thirdly, it is believed that the establishment of an auxiliary police force should help in improving law and order and in releasing UNOSOM soldiers from guard duties for other more demanding tasks. Lastly, a tactical quick reaction force will be available at the request of the Force Commander.

74. In the light of the above, I am prepared to accept the above-mentioned recommendations at this stage, given the need for maximum economy and efficiency and my constant endeavour to keep the size of the United Nations presence in any situation to the minimum. However, I should like to emphasize that I must reserve my right to revert to the Council in case I feel the need for additional troops to increase the strength of UNOSOM II, depending on the progress made in establishing a secure environment throughout the country. In conclusion I must point out that the security conditions in Somalia might compel me periodically to review the troop strength required to implement the mandate of UNOSOM II.

75. The force mentioned in paragraph 71 above will include:

(a) A Force headquarters;

(b) Five brigades;

(c) A logistic support group.

76. The logistic support group would, in the first and second phases, be provided mainly by the UNITAF logistics forces, until UNOSOM II can establish the necessary logistic support through organic forces or by contract. I would like to stress however that the ability of UNOSOM to carry out its mandate will depend on critical logistical and other support from the United States, including a tactical quick reaction force.

77. The combat forces would need the following capabilities:

(a) Patrolling and close-combat;

(b) Information-gathering and interpretation;

(c) Indirect fire;

(d) Anti-armour fire;

(e) All-weather night and day operations;

(f) Casualty evacuation;

(g) Tactical communications;

(h) Air support (fire power and transport).

78. The UNOSOM Force Commander would report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Areas of operations would be allocated to brigade commanders who would report directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander. These commanders would be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in the implementation of cease-fire/disarmament agreements in their respective areas of operations. A tactical quick reaction force of at least battalion strength to be provided by the United States will be available in support of UNOSOM II.

79. UNOSOM military operations would be conducted in four phases:

Phase I - Transition from UNITAF;

Phase II - Consolidation and expansion of security;

Phase III - Transfer to civilian institutions;

Phase IV - Redeployment.

These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas of operations might be implementing phase III while in another area phase I or II would still be in effect. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes. The Force Commander may shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

Phase I

80. In this phase, military operations would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Military support to relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition.

81. Prior to the UNOSOM II Force Commander's formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, certain preparatory steps would be required. The expansion of UNOSOM II Force headquarters would have to continue until it was operationally capable. UNITAF would have to ensure that subordinate elements that would remain in Somalia under UNOSOM II were given appropriate command and control structures. The United States Government would be asked to form a tactical quick reaction force to support UNOSOM II's Force Commander.

82. Upon receipt of a joint recommendation by the Commander of UNITAF and the UNOSOM II Force Commander, I would approve UNOSOM II's assumption of operational responsibility for the unit or units concerned. At the appropriate stage the UNOSOM II Force Commander would also take over the

logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In all phases, the United States tactical quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

83. When the UNOSOM II Force Commander has assumed operational responsibility within an area of operation, UNITAF personnel in that area of operation will be redeployed to their countries of origin at the discretion of their Government(s) and under the protection of UNOSOM II troops.

84. This phase would be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM, as well as other forces provided by other troop-contributing countries, have been placed under operational control of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

Phase II

85. Military operations in phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control over all assigned elements and designated activity. Continued efforts to assist relief activity and participate in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements would involve all military forces. Operations would be extended into northern Somalia, based on the port cities of Berbera and Bossasso, and moving to Hargeisa and Garoe. UNOSOM II military forces would assist any new humanitarian initiatives started in this region, particularly mine-clearance projects as addressed above. Phase II would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions.

Phase III

86. In this period, major efforts would be made to reduce military activity and assist civil authorities to exercise greater responsibility, according to their ability to do so. National rehabilitation and reconciliation initiatives under Somali leadership would be encouraged and supported by United Nations representatives. Military presence might be scaled down in the more stable areas and the tempo of military operations reduced as circumstances allow. Phase III would end when a Somali national police force was operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required.

Phase IV

87. At an appropriate stage, I would make a recommendation to the Council to redeploy or reduce the forces.

Rules of engagement

88. The rules of engagement would be defined by the UNOSOM II Force Commander. They would authorize and direct commanders to take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

89. The concept outlined in the present report would require a substantial input of financial resources. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report that will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM II for a period of 12 months. Overall operations will require 20,000 military personnel of all ranks plus 8,000 logistical support staff, as well as a considerably strengthened civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM II, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for this purpose. It would further be my intention to maintain the United Nations fund for operations in Somalia authorized by paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992). I appeal to all Member States that are in a position to do so to contribute generously to that fund. Such voluntary contributions would reduce the burden that Member States would have to bear under the assessment scheme. With this in mind, I intend to send emissaries to certain heads of State or Government to explain the operations and to encourage them to make generous donations to the fund.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

90. As the members of the Council are aware, the mission of UNITAF was originally envisaged as a short-term police action. I believe that UNITAF has made an important contribution in the international effort to stop the lawlessness and disarm the warring factions in its area of operations. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the week of 21 February 1993 have demonstrated the volatile situation that still exists. They underscore the fact, which I have indicated in the present report, that a secure environment has not yet been established. Moreover, there has been no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security is a matter of grave concern. I believe, therefore, that, if the Council determines that the time has come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM II is fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

91. The mandate of UNOSOM II, as conceived in the present report, would confer authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

92. Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use enforcement measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my conviction that the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves. Even if it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain circumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to substitute itself for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use its authority to impose one or another system of governmental organization. It may and should, however, be in a position to press for the observance of United Nations standards of human rights and justice.

93. UNOSOM II will continue to assist the factions in completing the total disarmament and demobilization process called for in the Addis Ababa accords, to ensure that the secure environment is established on a country-wide basis, and to monitor the strict observance of the cease-fire.

94. A secure environment continues to be essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of the country. The deployment of UNITAF forces has permitted a substantial increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and opened up access to more remote areas. Emergency relief assistance will continue to be required throughout 1993. There is also an urgent need for the international community to accelerate its efforts to assist the Somalis to rebuild their society, rehabilitate the decayed infrastructure and pave the way for a secure return of all refugees. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations is putting together a humanitarian programme for 1993 with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations organizations, ICRC and NGOs. I look forward to the support of donors for this programme at the United Nations Humanitarian Conference to be convened in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993.

95. There must be a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II without any hiatus that could be exploited by factions or gangs. UNOSOM II will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over seamlessly from UNITAF in each area from which it withdraws and to deploy troops in the north and along the boundary with Kenya. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area, when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM II in a given area.

96. A number of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed willingness to have their contingents serve eventually in UNOSOM II. It is my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in UNOSOM II as many contingents as possible that are already in Somalia serving under the command of UNITAF. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of UNITAF to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to above. While it is difficult to determine when this transfer will be completed, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will be 1 May 1993.

97. One further point would need to be clarified in any Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of UNOSOM II under the new mandate, namely that the deployment will be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council. Such deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders. The deployment of UNOSOM II would have to cover the whole country, including its borders, both for the purpose of controlling the movement of refugees and to prevent the illicit introduction of arms into Somalia and to avoid destabilization of the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Member States should be encouraged to monitor and report violations of the arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution 733 (1992), particularly those Member States that have ships operating off the coast of Somalia and the neighbouring countries of the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

98. I am aware of the very delicate question of the secession proclamation in the north. However, as the mandate of UNOSOM covers the entire country, troops will be deployed in the north as well as in the south. Such an international presence should help the process of rehabilitation and delivery of international assistance. The deployment of UNOSOM to the north would not prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their national future. I believe that the Somali political reconciliation process is broad enough to accommodate discussions and negotiations among all groups and factions.

99. With regard to political reconciliation, it is essential to maintain the momentum gained in Addis Ababa and convene a national reconciliation conference which could build on the results of the informal preparatory meeting of January 1993. This may be particularly important in view of the difficulties encountered in activating the Ad Hoc Committee established at Addis Ababa. It would also be desirable for such a conference to have broad participation by all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, etc. This would help to ensure that the validity and decisions of the conference would be recognized by the Somali public at large. I am also reassured by the tangible support extended to me by LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Horn of Africa Committee. Their assistance in the creation of the Somali trust fund and in our efforts to establish a rehabilitation programme as well as their contribution towards political reconciliation have been valuable.

100. It was the uniqueness of the situation in Somalia that led to the adoption of resolution 794 (1992) by the Security Council. While the emergency operation launched by the international community in the form of UNITAF has achieved, to a considerable extent, the immediate objective of making sure humanitarian assistance reaches the needy, I must emphasize that the unique features of the situation continue to prevail. There is still no effective functioning Government in the country. There is still no organized civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. As recent events have tragically demonstrated, the atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated. I have repeatedly stated that my

major concern has been with the existence of large amounts of armaments in the hands of the factions and guerrilla bands. The operations launched by UNITAF, especially in the past few weeks, have undoubtedly succeeded in getting some of these stocks of weaponry confiscated and destroyed. It is, however, obvious that we have only scratched the surface of the problem so far. Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

101. UNOSOM II would be the first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community. It would be an expression of the international community's determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own. It would also be an answer of the international community to the universally shared concern that the situation in Somalia, though primarily of a domestic nature, could affect the peace and stability of the entire region of which Somalia forms an integral part, unless energetic and timely action is taken to avert a major humanitarian and security disaster. The task ahead would not be easy. UNOSOM II might frequently come under criticism for acts of omission or commission. It is also difficult to anticipate, with any degree of certainty, the duration of UNOSOM II'S mandate. None the less, I am satisfied that the recommendations I have made in the present report are a necessary, indeed inescapable response of the international community to the tragedy in Somalia.

102. As the mission of UNITAF nears completion, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the Government of the United States for its timely initiative in offering its assistance to the United Nations at a crucial stage of its operation in Somalia, and for the skill and efficiency with which UNITAF has carried out its mandate. I also wish to express my gratitude to all the other Governments that have contributed contingents to UNITAF, and to their soldiers for their dedicated service to this operation.

103. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Kittani, my Special Representative, and to Brigadier-General Shaheen, the Force Commander, and the staff of UNOSOM, as well as the staff of ICRC and NGOs, for the devotion, skill and leadership that they have demonstrated, often in extremely trying circumstances, in the service of the United Nations in Somalia.

104. Lastly, I wish to express my sincere condolences to the Government of the United States upon the death of members of its contingent while serving with UNITAF in Somalia. I should also like to pay a heartfelt tribute to the staff members who died in the performance of their duties in Somalia as well as the members of the relief community, including those of UNICEF, ICRC and NGOs who sacrificed their lives while assisting the Somali people.